Abstract-In this work we consider the problem of fault localization in transparent optical networks. We attempt to localize single-link failures by utilizing statistical machine learning techniques trained on data that describe the network state upon current and past failure incidents. In particular, a Gaussian process classifier is trained on historical data extracted from the examined network, with the goal of modeling and predicting the failure probability of each link therein. To limit the set of suspect links for every failure incident, the proposed approach is complemented by the utilization of a graph-based correlation heuristic. The proposed approach is tested on a number of datasets generated for an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing-based optical network, and demonstrates that the approach achieves a high localization accuracy (91%-99%) that is insignificantly affected as the size of the historical dataset is reduced. The approach is also compared to a conventional fault localization method that is based on the utilization of monitoring information. It is shown that the conventional method significantly increases the network cost, as measured by the number of monitoring nodes required to achieve the same accuracy as that achieved by the proposed approach. The proposed scheme can be used by service providers to reduce the network cost related to the fault localization procedure. As the approach is generic and does not depend on specific network technologies, it can be applied to different network types, e.g., fixed-grid or space-division multiplexing elastic optical networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
F ault management has long been a critical task for the control and management of telecommunications networks, and it becomes even more challenging in transparent optical networks, where the signal remains in the optical domain for its entire path. In optical networks, the failure of a network element can result in the failure of several lightpaths and can thus cause huge data losses. This problem becomes more crucial when lightpaths are migrated to high bit rates, such as 40 or 100 Gbps and beyond [with the latter being expected to be accommodated in future orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)-based elastic optical networks]. Commonly observed faults in optical networks are caused by fiber cuts, equipment failures, excessive bit errors, and human error. After the detection of a failure, protection/restoration techniques are invoked so that the traffic is recovered prior to the localization and repair of the faulty component [1] [2] [3] . Most of the existing works deal with the single-link failure scenario, since the occurrence of more than one simultaneous link failure in an optical network is not very common.
In opaque optical networks, it is relatively simple to perform failure detection and localization [4] . However, in transparent optical networks, without any signaling mechanisms/protocols that can be utilized for fault detection at intermediate nodes, failure localization becomes a challenging task. The reader should note that if such signaling protocols are implemented, they can be utilized for effectively detecting and identifying a failure. This is, however, at the expense of increased failure localization latency, protocol complexity, and cost (cost of hardware required to implement such a protocol at each network node). Existing fault localization approaches in transparent optical networks with no signaling mechanisms at intermediate nodes [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , where the term fault may refer to both equipment and/or link failures, assume the use of monitoring equipment for accurately localizing failures. Monitoring equipment is able to send alarms and notifications when the optical signal deviates from its expected value. Thus, failure management relies on the information collected from the network through captured signal alarms. The majority of monitoring equipment works by tapping part of the optical signal (e.g., using couplers). Thus, for monitoring purposes, the optical signal is usually converted to the electrical domain. Even though monitoring does not influence optical signal transmission, it is costly, may result in noisy alarms, and leads to extra bandwidth resource utilization, as well as to additional delay and extra control complexity at the electrical domain.
In this work, we examine the use of advanced statistical machine learning (ML) techniques to address the fault localization problem. In particular, we attempt to localize single-link failures, in an automated fashion and as accurately and fast as possible, by applying advanced statistical ML techniques to historical data that describe past failure incidents. The approach does not utilize any other monitoring information apart from the information obtained by the destination nodes of the established lightpaths (by the monitors installed in the digital signal processing of the coherent receivers). Thus, in this work, there is no assumption of any electronic signaling mechanisms/protocols that can be utilized for fault detection (and consequently a fault localization process) at intermediate nodes. The aim of this approach is to reduce the monitoring and probing equipment utilized for the fault localization procedure, while at the same time avoiding the added failure localization latency, protocol complexity, and hardware cost incurred when signaling mechanisms are used at intermediate nodes for fault detection/localization purposes. Thus, this technique can be viewed as a cost-saving alternative to using monitoring equipment/probes in all-optical networks. Further, accurate fault localization based on the proposed method could potentially also result in a small reduction in the mean time to repair the failure, as the time taken to restore the system to normalcy includes the period of diagnosis of the problem as well as its rectification. For example, in the event of a fiber cut, even though the repair time depends mostly on the time required to send someone to the site, dig up the fiber, and repair the failure, accurate fault localization will avoid delays that may result from sending technicians to the wrong link.
The framework under examination was initially introduced in our work in Ref. [13] , demonstrating a high localization accuracy in practical time. In Ref. [13] , the fault localization scheme consists of two steps. The first step is a path correlation procedure that works by correlating the affected and the unaffected lightpaths [the graph-based correlation (GBC) heuristic]. The path correlation procedure either identifies the failed link or a set of links suspected of causing the failure. The second step is activated only if the first step does not isolate the failed link. In particular, the second step generates a failure probability for each suspect link, according to a Gaussian process (GP) classifier trained on past failure incidents. The failure probability indicates the likelihood that each suspect link caused the failure.
In this paper, our work in Ref. [13] is greatly extended, with the intent of providing a better understanding and insight into the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed approach. In particular, the work in Ref. [13] is now described in greater detail, and it is evaluated for more training sets consisting of five thousand, three thousand, and one thousand incidents. By providing more performance results regarding the fault localization accuracy of the approach for different-sized training sets, we investigate whether the number of past failure incidents affects the approach accuracy. We show that the accuracy is affected insignificantly as the amount of available data on past failures is reduced. Results on the time required for training the GP classifier and for classifying a single incident for each experiment (using different sizes of training sets) are also reported.
The work in Ref. [13] is further extended by comparing the proposed fault localization scheme to a conventional method that is based on installed monitoring equipment. In particular, for the conventional method we assume that monitoring information is collected and correlated, not only from the destination nodes of the established connections, but also from the extra monitoring equipment installed in the network. Initially, related work that utilizes monitoring equipment is described, followed by a novel correlation procedure that extends the GBC heuristic to the graph-based correlation with monitors (GBCM) heuristic, which also takes into account the extra monitoring information. With the GBCM heuristic, we attempt to identify the number of extra monitoring nodes required to achieve the same accuracy as that achieved by the proposed approach (GBC heuristic and GP classifier).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses related work, Sections III and IV provide the approach overview and the approach motivation, respectively, and Section V formulates the proposed fault localization framework. Section VI describes analytically the proposed fault localization approach, and Section VII describes the dataset generation procedure. Section VIII is focused on the fault localization approach developed for comparison purposes, Section IX is focused on the performance evaluation results, and finally Section X provides the concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
As was pointed out earlier, existing fault localization approaches [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] assume the use of monitoring equipment in order to make the fault localization problem tractable. In particular, the authors of [6] [7] [8] formulated the addressed problem as an integer linear program (ILP). They assumed the utilization of supervisory lightpaths (lightpaths established just for fault localization purposes) in addition to the installed monitoring equipment. As ILP formulations are subject to very high computation complexity and can only be implemented in small networks, the authors of Refs. [6] [7] [8] also proposed heuristic approaches for achieving fast and highly accurate localization. The work in Ref. [4] proposed a heuristic algorithm for finding the amount of new monitoring equipment required and its best placement so that failures can be precisely identified. The work in Ref. [9] proposed a fuzzy fault set (FFS) approach aiming at limiting the number of suspect failed links. They proposed a restoration algorithm that acts according to the FFS approach. Further, the work in Refs. [10, 11] proposed efficient monitoring trail allocation schemes (allocation of supervisory lightpaths) aiming at unambiguously identifying the failed link, at the expense of the extra bandwidth required by the supervisory lightpaths. Specifically, in these works, capacity bounds were derived regarding the spare bandwidth required by the monitoring trails for accurately identifying the failed link.
A probabilistic model was further introduced in Ref. [12] for describing failures in data center networks. The model in Ref. [12] depends on periodic monitoring data and on data collected by monitoring the flow of injected supervisory paths. The authors utilized noisy monitoring data collected from a real network, with the goal of reducing the number of suspect equipment and/or links.
Recently, the authors of Ref. [5] proposed a fault localization scheme for unambiguously localizing the failed link. The scheme consists of two steps. The first step is the path correlation procedure, which works by correlating the established connections. The affected connections are identified according to the number of triggered alarms (by the monitors installed in the digital signal processing of the coherent receivers). If, upon correlation, the failed link is not unambiguously identified, then the second step is activated. The second step is a path correlation procedure that utilizes extra monitoring information extracted by establishing probing lightpaths. The extra bandwidth and monitoring equipment required for unambiguously solving the fault localization problem were examined for different traffic loads.
Contrary to these previous works, in this work we examine a novel fault localization method that achieves high localization accuracy without utilizing extra monitoring equipment or probing lightpaths. In particular, upon a failure incident, the affected and unaffected lightpaths are identified and correlated according to the alarms triggered by the monitors installed at the coherent receivers [5] . If the correlation procedure does not yield the failed link, but rather a set of links suspected of causing the failure, then a failure probability is generated for each one of the suspect links. This is done with respect to a GP classifier trained on a dataset of past failure incidents. The training dataset describes both the network state (established lightpaths upon the failure) and the time dependencies between the successively occurring failures. The main advantage of the proposed approach is that it does not assume the utilization of any probing lightpaths (extra monitoring equipment), thus reducing the network cost and the control management complexity.
III. APPROACH OVERVIEW
For the proposed approach, we assume that historical data can be found readily in network management databases and provide information on the network state upon failure incidents. We assume that a path computation element is present (i.e., the application-based network operation architecture [14] ) that is resource aware and is able to maintain a centralized traffic engineering (TE) database with detailed spectrum availability information. Thus, it is capable of specifying the full details of each link and each lightpath. From this TE database, information can be extracted and stored in a knowledge database to be used for training/validating/applying the fault localization model proposed. Further, we assume that a failure is detected (at the destination nodes of the established lightpaths) through a number of monitoring alarms capable of identifying, among the established lightpaths, the affected lightpaths. In the data plane, the optical network is considered to be equipped with monitors, which are installed in the digital signal processing of the coherent receivers [5] .
As was pointed out, the examined fault localization scheme consists of two phases. The first phase is activated upon the detection of a failure and consists of correlating the affected and unaffected lightpaths. For the path correlation phase, the GBC heuristic [13] is used. The second phase is activated only if the GBC heuristic reports that multiple links are suspected of causing the failure. This phase consists of computing a failure probability for each suspect link. The failure probability is computed by a GP classifier trained on a set that describes past failure incidents. The flowchart in Fig. 1 summarizes the control plane actions taken upon a failure incident according to the proposed approach. To ensure the network's resiliency, we assume that a fault protection scheme is invoked immediately after the detection of the failure. For example, a path-based protection scheme [1] can be immediately invoked after the detection of the failure to restore the affected traffic. Concurrent with but independent of the failure restoration process, the failure localization process is invoked to identify and repair the failure. Once the failed link is identified and repaired, the resources used for the restoration procedure can be released by reverting the affected traffic back to the primary lightpaths.
IV. APPROACH MOTIVATION
In this work we define as link failure the incident caused by the abnormal operation of a fiber link or any component attached to a fiber link. The proposed fault localization scheme is based on the exploitation of the mean time between failures (MTBF). The MTBF is usually modeled by well-known distributions, such as the exponential distribution or the Weibull distribution. Both distributions have a scale parameter describing the MTBF. The Weibull distribution also has a shape parameter that describes how the MTBF changes over time. Thus, the Weibull distribution is also capable of describing the aging effects of the network components. In this work, and according to Ref. [15] , we assume that the MTBF follows the Weibull distribution, with each one of the network links being described by its own scale and shape parameters. In particular, in Ref. [15] it was shown that the empirical cumulative distribution function of the MTBF (of optical-network- related failures) is approximated very well by a Weibull distribution in which the failure rate changes over time. Equivalently, the mean time between successive in time failures depends on the failure occurrence time of the previous failure (the link failures are time dependent). This outcome was the result of analyzing a dataset consisting of failure information for all links in the continental U.S. for a period of 7 months [15] .
In this work, we generate a dataset of failure information, assuming that the MTBF of each link in the network follows the Weibull distribution. To create a dataset that captures the time dependencies between the successively occurring failures, we count (1) the total number of failures in the network Ci and (2) the number of failures c j i associated with each link e j in the network, up to the last known failure incident i. Then, by dividing c j i by Ci, for each incident i, we can compute the failure rate of each link j at each time point. We can thus also keep track of how failure rates of different links compare with each other. In the dataset we also include information describing the network state upon each incident i (i.e., affected and unaffected connections).
Such historical information can then be utilized by a probabilistic model to find the likelihood that a link e j is the failed link upon incident i. In this work we use a GP classifier to calculate this probability. The reader should note that the key thrust of this paper does not lie in the development of a new ML methodology, but rather, it addresses a problem of major significance to the optical networking community by utilizing an established and well-known statistical ML technique.
The class of GPs is one of the most widely used families of stochastic processes for modeling dependent data observed over time. Thus, GPs are useful for sequential data, such as time-series and tracking applications, and can be used in particular for active data selection in such systems [16] . GPs constitute one of the most important Bayesian ML approaches and are based on a particularly effective method for placing a prior distribution over the space of regression functions. They have a small number of tunable parameters, can be trained on relatively small training sets, and allow us to capture nonlinear and skewed artifacts, thus exhibiting significant robustness to outliers and the ability to handle sparse data without becoming prone to overtraining. Compared to another popular form of discriminative kernel machines, i.e., the support vector machine (SVM) [17] , GPs possess several advantages, with the most significant being that the GP model produces an output with a clear probabilistic interpretation, providing a measure of uncertainty for the obtained predictions, unlike SVMs, which merely provide point predictions [18] .
V. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The approach assumes a network topology represented by the graph G V; E, where V corresponds to the set of network nodes and E to the set of links in the network.
Specifically, we denote the set as E fe j j j 1; …; Dg, where D is the total number of links in G. As pointed out, upon a link failure, the affected destination nodes will report the abnormal network behavior. Upon failure detection, the GBC heuristic described in detail in Section VI.A is utilized to reduce the number of suspect links in the network. Briefly, the GBC heuristic, upon failure i, takes as input the set of affected paths Pi and the set of unaffected paths P 0 i, and through a path correlation procedure returns the set of suspect failed links Si. Assuming that for every incident i the GBC returns a set Si with multiple suspect links, the set Si is utilized to create the observation vector xi x 1 i; …; x D i (independent variable), where
c j i is the number of times link e j has failed up to incident i − 1, and Ci is the total number of failures in the system up to incident i, such that Ci P D j1 c j i 1. Each vector xi is associated with a corresponding dependent variable vector yi y 1 i; …; y D i, where
and P D j1 y j i −D 1, as we are only considering a single-link failure scenario. Thus, a training set D fxi; yigji 1; …; ng is created, with n being the total number of known failure incidents. The dataset D is then utilized to train the used GP classifier, as described in detail in Section VI.B. Section VII describes the simulation procedure followed to generate the dataset D.
VI. LINK FAILURE LOCALIZATION
As pointed out, a GP classifier is trained with the dataset D to learn to predict the link failures in the network. According to Eq. (1), the creation of dataset D depends on a set of candidates S fSiji 1; …; ng, calculated by means of the GBC heuristic. Therefore, we first describe the GBC heuristic and then proceed with a brief presentation of the GP classification technique.
A. GBC Heuristic
For the description of the GBC heuristic, we define as P 0 i fp 0 m ijm 1; …; t 0 ig the set of unaffected paths upon incident i, and as Pi fp m ijm 1; …; tig the set of affected paths upon incident i. Note that a path is considered affected if it passes through the failed link. Otherwise, it is considered unaffected. Additionally, a path is defined as the set of links it traverses. On this basis, the GBC heuristic is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: GBC Heuristic
Input: The sets P and P 0 , where P fPiji 1; …; ng and P 0 fP 0 iji 1; …; ng. Output: The set S, where S fSiji 1; …; ng.
if Ai Ø then 5:
Ai p 1 i 6:
end if 7:
Si Ai − Ai ⋂ A 0 i 8: end for 9: return S The basic idea of the GBC heuristic is to intersect the affected paths in order to obtain the set of links Ai that are common to every affected path. If, however, only a single path is affected, then the set Ai is just the set of links traversing this path. Then, the GBC removes from set Ai the links that cannot be considered suspect, as they also belong to the set of unaffected links A 0 i. The heuristic terminates by returning the set Si. Note that GBC assumes that there always exists at least one affected path that triggers the fault localization procedure. Figure 2 is used as an illustrative example of the GBC heuristic. Specifically, Fig. 2 shows that upon the failure of link e 3 , paths p 1 and p 2 are affected; p 0 3 is unaffected. Thus, the GBC heuristic first intersects paths p 1 and p 2 , resulting in the set A fe 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 ; e 4 g. Then, since A 0 fe 1 g, GBC removes e 1 from A and returns S fe 2 ; e 3 ; e 4 g as the set of suspect links.
B. GP Classification
If we consider an observation space X, then a GP f x, where x ∈ X, is defined as a collection of random variables, any finite number of which have a joint Gaussian distribution [19] . A GP is completely defined by its mean and covariance functions. If the mean function for a real process f x is defined as mx and the covariance function evaluated at x and x 0 is defined as kx; x 0 , then we have
and
Hence, the GP can be written as
where N ·jμ; Σ is a Gaussian distribution with mean μ and covariance Σ.
Given the dataset D fxi; yigji 1; …; ng, with the D-dimensional variables xi and the targets yi defined in Section V, we wish to make predictions for new inputs x that have not been observed in the training set. In particular, we wish to predict the corresponding outputs y based on the information contained in the training set D
In this work, we have formulated the problem according to the GP binary classification rather than as a multiclass formulation. In general, a multiclass formulation of the GP, for instance, based on postulating a softmax likelihood function, yields classifiers of higher accuracy when dealing with challenging classification problems. However, this high accuracy comes at the cost of a significant increase in computational complexity. This is due to the fact that the softmax likelihood assumption results in an analytically intractable expression for the predictive posterior. Thus, the posterior sought has to be approximated, e.g., by means of a Taylor expansion, which imposes significant computational costs due to the need to compute and invert Hessian matrices (note that even for the small-sized networks utilized in this work, in our MATLAB machine with a CPU at 2.60 GHz and 8 GB RAM, the multiclass classification was already not possible due to memory limitations). Therefore, to ameliorate these prohibitive computational costs, in this work we resort to an alternative formulation of the multiclass classification problem via GPs as a set of one-versus-all binary classification problems. In essence, this alternative formulation consists of postulating a set of K binary GP classifiers, where K is the total number of classes. In this setting, each postulated classifier, say the ith, is trained with the "positive" (1) class of the model being trained on data from the ith available class, and the "zero" (0) class of the model being trained on data from the rest of the available classes. As discussed in Chapter 3 of Ref. [19] , such an approach allows us to deal with binary GP classifiers, which are orders of magnitude more computationally efficient, while keeping the total number of postulated models low in typical cases where the number of classes K is limited, as is the case in our work. In addition, in such cases of low K values, the classification accuracy that is eventually obtained does not turn out to be significantly lower than the multiclass GP model that postulates a softmax likelihood (Chapter 3 of [19] ). Indeed, we have empirically confirmed these findings in our work, where the postulated set of binary GP classifiers, deployed under a one-versus-all rationale, worked extremely well, as it returned models of very high accuracy (91%-99%). Thus, the dataset D is decomposed into D datasets such that D fD j jj 1;…;Dg, where D j fxi;y j igji 1;…;ng. Then, each dataset D j is utilized by a separate binary GP classifier that produces one probabilistic model for each link in the network. Therefore, in the discussion that follows we focus on the GP-based binary classification problem. Note that for brevity, notation j is omitted in the remainder of this section.
1) Model Formulation and Training:
In binary GP classification, the postulated model attempts to predict the probability of the dependent variable being "on," i.e., y
where kx ≜ kx1; x; …; kxn; x T ;
and K is the matrix of the covariances between the n training data points, usually referred to as the gram matrix:
KX;X ≜ : (8) Note that in the above equations, kxl; xm is the kernel function of the postulated GP model, which expresses the similarity between two data points xl and xm and takes nonnegative values in R . In our application, we employ the automatic relevance determination (ARD) kernel [20] . Our selection is due to the capability of the ARD kernel to determine how relevant each input component is, thereby omitting input components that are deemed irrelevant [19] . The ARD kernel reads kxl; xm θ 0 exp
Here, θ 0 and fη j g D j1 are hyperparameters of the kernel function that are optimized as part of the training procedure of the GP classifier. For this purpose, we resort to maximization of the marginal log-likelihood of the model with respect to θ 0 and fη j g D j1 , as discussed in Ref. [20] . 2) Prediction Generation: Inference is divided into two steps. First, we use Eq. (6) to derive the posterior distribution of the latent function value corresponding to the given test case: pf jX; y; x Z pf jX; x; f pf jX; ydf ;
where, for brevity, we denote y fyig n i1 , f f X, and f f x, while pf jX; y pyjf pf jX∕pyjX (11) is the posterior over the latent function values on the training data points. Subsequently, we can use this posterior over the latent f to produce a probabilistic prediction:
π ≜ py 1jX; y; x Z σ f pf jX; y; xdf : (12) As the integral in Eq. (10) is analytically intractable, we employ a first-order Taylor expansion of the integral around its mean. This approach, commonly referred to as the Laplace approximation, yields the predictive distribution expression [19] :
π ≃ E q πjX; y; x Z σf qf jX; y; xdf ;
where qf jX; y; x is the Gaussian approximation of pf jX; y; x obtained by the Laplace technique; its corresponding mean and variance expressions, E q f jX; y; x and V q f jX; y; x, respectively, are omitted from this paper due to space restrictions, but can be found in Eqs. (3.21) and (3.24) of Ref. [19] .
VII. DATASET GENERATION
In this work, the dataset D was generated for an OFDMbased elastic optical network. In general, the dataset generation process of our approach is divided into two phases. In the first phase, a list of sequential (in time) failures is created. Then, these failures are injected into a dynamic routing and spectrum allocation (RSA) system to create the network incidents from which the network features are extracted.
A. Link Failure Generation
To generate the specific points in time when each link has failed, we assumed that the times between the successive failures of each specific link e j follow the Weibull distribution, as explained in Section IV. Each link e j is thus characterized by two parameters: the scale parameter λ j , indicating the statistical dispersion of the probability distribution, and the shape parameter β j , indicating how quickly the failure rate of the link increases with time.
In this work, each λ j parameter was generated by multiplying the inverse of the length of each link by a random number generated by the uniform distribution. This was done in order to assign to each link a scale parameter relevant to its length (i.e., longer links are expected to fail more frequently than shorter links due to the longer geographical distance they are spanning and due to the larger number of components expected to be attached to that link). Each β j parameter was generated by multiplying the length of each e j link by a random number generated by the uniform distribution. To avoid the generation of large shape parameters, which very quickly increase the failure rate, the β j parameters were divided by a large constant number. Then, a number of failure occurrence times for each link were drawn by τ j ∼ Weiλ j ; β j . L j is the list in which the failure occurrence times τ j of link e j are reported.
Once the lists L j are generated, the list L is created by sequentially adding into L the link with the minimum time of occurrence among all the times reported in lists L j . Once a new link e j is added into L, then its failure occurrence time is deleted from list L j . This procedure is repeated until all lists L j become empty. Thus, a list L is created, in which links appear sequentially according to their times of failure occurrence. Specifically, L fe k iji 1; …; ng, and e k i ∈ E is the failed link upon incident i. Once list L is generated, the failed links are sequentially injected into the evolving network in order for the feature extraction phase to take place.
B. Feature Extraction
Connection requests arrive dynamically in the network according to a Poisson process with exponentially distributed holding times. The source-destination pair and the spectrum demand for each connection request are randomly generated. Then, for each request, the RSA algorithm is used to find a route and a free spectrum allocation for establishing the connection. For the routing subproblem, Dijkstra's algorithm [21] is used, while for the spectrum allocation procedure, the first-fit algorithm is utilized. According to the first-fit algorithm, the connection is established on the first free spectrum slots that meet the spectrum continuity, subcarrier consecutiveness, and no frequency overlapping constraints [22] . A connection request is accepted into the network if a route is found that meets the spectrum continuity, subcarrier consecutiveness, and no frequency overlapping constraints; otherwise, it is blocked.
As the network evolves, link failures are injected sequentially in order to capture the network state upon their occurrence. In particular, with every arriving request, a single-link failure is injected, following the sequence of links in list L. Upon the injection of each failure i, the network state is inspected to identify the set of affected paths Pi and the set of unaffected paths P 0 i. A counter c j i is also kept for each link e j ∈ E and for each incident i, according to
Finally, the counter Ci is computed for each incident i as Ci Ci − 1 1. Then, according to the aforementioned procedure, if the number of total incidents is n, the sets P fPiji 1; …; ng and P 0 fP 0 iji 1; …; ng are generated as inputs to the GBC heuristic, as described in Section VI.A. In addition, the sets C fCiji 1; …; ng and c j fc j iji; j 1; …; ng are generated and used in conjunction with the GBC output set S fSiji 1; …; ng for the creation of the final dataset D fxi; yigji 1; …; ng, as described in Section V.
VIII. COMPARING THE PROPOSED APPROACH
To compare the proposed approach to a method that uses extra monitoring equipment [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , the GBC heuristic is extended to the GBCM heuristic. With the GBCM technique, we wish to identify the number of monitoring nodes required to achieve the same fault localization accuracy as that achieved by the proposed approach. As we wish to identify the necessary number of monitoring nodes, we do not consider using any probing lightpaths (new lightpaths for improving the path correlation performance, which also increase the bandwidth utilization during the fault localization process). Note that the GBCM heuristic is not directly comparable to the methods proposed in Refs. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , as in these works the utilization of probing lightpaths is also assumed. However, it is directly comparable to our fault localization method (GBC with GP classifier), which does not utilize any probing lightpaths. To evaluate the GBCM heuristic for different sets of monitoring nodes, monitors are added one by one into the network. We assume that a monitor is added each time at the node with the maximum degree that is not yet equipped with a monitor. The flowchart in Fig. 3 illustrates the control plane actions taken upon a failure incident according to the comparative approach.
To enable the comparative approach, we assume that some of the network nodes are equipped with additional monitors that work by tapping part of the signal (e.g., using couplers) and converting the optical signal to the electrical domain for monitoring purposes. Thus, with the extra monitoring nodes, signaling alarms can be triggered and collected not only from the destination nodes of the established connections but also from any intermediate node of the established connection equipped with monitors.
The GBCM heuristic is similar to the GBC heuristic that correlates the affected and the unaffected paths, with the goal of localizing the failed link as accurately as possible. The only difference is that the GBCM heuristic, prior to the path correlation procedure, decomposes the affected lightpaths into a number of path segments according to the extra monitoring equipment in the network. Each path segment is then declared to be affected or unaffected according to what each monitoring node has detected. The path correlation procedure is subsequently performed on the new set of affected and unaffected paths/path segments. Specifically, if k nodes along an affected path are capable of detecting the failure (k − 1 monitoring nodes plus the destination node), then the path is decomposed into k path segments. The first segment originates at the source node of the path and terminates at the first monitoring node (counting the monitoring nodes from the source node to the destination node), the second segment starts at the first monitoring node in the path and ends at the second monitoring node, and the same procedure follows until the destination node is reached (the kth segment is created). Each one of these segments is then declared to be either affected or unaffected as follows: if the jth monitoring node is the first node in the path that detected the failure, then the jth segment is declared to be affected; all the other segments are declared to be unaffected. The affected path segments are then included in the set of affected connections, and the unaffected path segments are included in the set of unaffected connections. The path correlation procedure is performed according to the updated sets of affected and unaffected connections.
To formally describe the GBCM heuristic, the sets Si, P 0 ifp 0 m ijm 1;…;t 0 ig, and Pifp m ijm 1;…;tig, where i denotes the ith failure incident, are as previously defined in Sections V and VI. As a reminder, Si is the set of suspect failed links upon incident i, P 0 i is the set of unaffected paths upon incident i, and Pi is the set of affected paths upon incident i. A path is just the set of links it traverses. We additionally define the following:
• Incoming segmentation link: Given a path p m i ∈ Pi, a link e j ∈ p m i is said to be an incoming segmentation link if e j is entering a monitoring node or the destination node of the path.
• Outgoing segmentation link: Given a path p m i ∈ Pi, a link e j ∈ p m i is said to be an outgoing segmentation link if e j is exiting a monitoring node or the source node of the path.
• Segmentation link: An incoming or outgoing segmentation link.
• Segment: Given a path p m i ∈ Pi, a path between two segmentation links is said to be a segment of the path if the path originates at an outgoing segmentation link and terminates at an incoming segmentation link, and it does not pass through any other segmentation link of the path.
• jth monitoring node (q j ): Given a path p m i ∈ Pi, the jth monitoring node, denoted as q j , is defined as the jth node of p m i with monitoring capabilities (note that we start counting monitoring nodes from the source node of p m i).
• jth segment (Seg j ): If the last link of a particular segment (the incoming segmentation link) is attached to q j , then that segment is the jth segment, denoted as Seg j .
On this basis, the GBCM heuristic is described in Algorithm 2. Figure 4 is used to describe the segmentation procedure of the GBCM heuristic. Specifically, Fig. 4 illustrates one lightpath established in the network upon the failure of link e 3 . Nodes denoted with q 1 ; q 2 , and q 3 are the monitoring nodes along the affected path fe 1 ; e 2 ; …; e n g.
According to the failed link, only nodes q 2 and q 3 detect the failure.
Algorithm 2: GBCM Heuristic
Identify the incoming and the outgoing segmentation links of p m i (the segmentation links of p m i).
4:
Identify the segments of p m i.
5:
Let k be the total number of segments of p m i.
6:
c → 0.
7:
for j 1 to k do 8:
if (c 0 AND q j has detected the failure) then 9:
Add Seg j in Pi 10:
c → 1 11:
Add Seg j in P 0 i 13:
end if 14:
end for 15:
Remove p m i from Pi 16: end for 17: end for 18: Return sets P and P 0 . 19: Execute GBC Heuristic (Algorithm 1) on sets P and P 0 . 20: Return set S.
In Fig. 4 , links e 1 ; e 3 , and e n are the incoming segmentation links of the affected path and links e 1 ; e 2 , and e 4 are the outgoing segmentation links of the affected path. Thus, links e 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 ; e 4 , and e n are the segmentation links of the path. The affected path is then decomposed into three path segments according to the three monitoring nodes. Specifically, Seg 1 fe 1 g (starts from an outgoing segmentation link and ends at an incoming segmentation link), Seg 2 fe 2 ; e 3 g, and Seg 3 fe 4 ; e 5 ; …; e n g.
It follows that Seg 2 is declared to be the affected segment, since q 2 is the first monitoring node that detected the failure, while Seg 1 and Seg 3 are declared to be unaffected segments. Thus, Seg 2 is added to the set of affected paths, while Seg 1 and Seg 3 are added to the set of unaffected paths. Then the GBCM heuristic is executed on the sets of affected and unaffected paths in order to reduce the set of suspect links. As previously stated, the objective of the GBCM heuristic is to find the necessary number of intermediate monitoring nodes so that we reach the accuracy of the proposed fault localization method (GBC heuristic complemented with the GP classifier). 
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The network topology in Fig. 5 was utilized to evaluate the proposed fault localization scheme. The exact length for each link is shown in Table I . The λ j and β j parameters of the Weibull distribution used for generating list L are also shown in Table I .
Dataset D was created by simulating dynamic point-topoint connection requests for three different network scenarios: for a network load of (a) 7, (b) 10, or (c) 20 Erlangs. For all three cases, each spectral slot in the network was set at 12.5 GHz, with each fiber link utilizing 400 slots. 15,000 connection requests were generated, with the connection bandwidth of each request being randomly distributed in the set of bandwidth slots B f2; 4; 7; 8; 13; 16; 32; 64; 80; 100g. Note that such lightly loaded networks (7 to 20 Erlangs) were chosen in order to create a large number of network incidents i for which the GBC heuristic returns a set Si with multiple suspect links in it (for heavier loads, it is expected that the GBC heuristic will succeed in isolating the failed link).
The network statistics related to the aforementioned simulation parameters are shown in Table II . In summary, Table II reports that, for all network cases, the blocking probability is 0, and that as the network load increases, more lightpaths are expected to be simultaneously established in the network upon a failure incidence; that is, as the network load increases, more information is passed to the GBC heuristic to isolate the failed link.
For the creation of the dataset D, 10,000 failures were injected into the network. Thus, a dataset D was created for n 10; 000 incidents. The dataset D was then divided into the training dataset D train and into the test dataset D test that is utilized to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach.
A. Model Accuracy
The approach is evaluated for a training dataset consisting of the first 7000 incidents. The last 3000 incidents were kept for testing purposes. As described in Section VI.B, the binary GP classifier was applied to our data, and thus the training was performed in a "one versus the others" fashion. Thus, a probabilistic model was computed for each link in the network. In our training example, the training set D train was modified for each link e j ∈ E in such way that from each D train j , the incidents for which only one link was reported as suspect and x j · 0 were removed. The final number of training incidents for each training dataset D train j and for each network scenario examined is shown in Table III. After the training procedure, the evaluation phase was performed on D test . Among the 3000 incidents for which we want to identify the failed link, a number of incidents for which the GBC heuristic accurately identified the failed link were removed. Information regarding D test r , which is the set created after the removal of the incidents identified by the GBC heuristic, is shown in Table IV. Further,  Table IV For the incidents in D test r , a probabilistic value was generated according to each trained link model, and the link with the maximum value was chosen as the failed link. Table V summarizes the results. In particular, Table V gives the GP accuracy for each network load and the total accuracy of the proposed approach, which is the percentage of correctly classified incidents resulting from both the GP classifier and the GBC heuristic over the total number of incidents tested. The results clearly show that the approach achieves an overall high accuracy (93%-99%) for networks that are lightly loaded (7 to 20 Erlangs).
The results also show that as the load increases, the approach accuracy increases significantly. This is the case because the GBC heuristic performs better as more paths that are simultaneously established are now correlated. Further, the GP classifier performs better as the average number of suspect links in D test r is reduced (i.e., the uncertainty is reduced). Note that the GP classifier required approximately 1 h for the training procedure and approximately 1.3 s to classify a single incident on our MATLAB machine with a CPU at 2.60 GHz and 8 GB RAM.
B. Examining Model Accuracy for Different-Sized Training Sets
The model accuracy is evaluated for three more training sets consisting of 5000, 3000, and 1000 training instances. We are interested in examining the model accuracy as the number of training instances decreases. All the training sets examined were generated according to the simulation parameters previously described in Section IX.
To train a probabilistic model for each link in the network, each training set examined was modified to its corresponding D selected for testing purposes. Information for each D test r , which is the set created after the removal of the incidents identified by the GBC heuristic, is similar to that shown in Table IV . This is reasonable, as in each D test , the number of incidents is equal to the number utilized in the D test for the 7000-incident training set. Further, all D test sets were generated through the same simulation procedure as that followed for the 7000-incident training set.
For the incidents in each D test r , a probabilistic value was generated according to each trained link model, and the link with the maximum value was chosen as the failed link. Tables IX-XI summarize the results. Specifically, Table IX corresponds to the results of the 5000-incident training set, Table X corresponds to the results of the 3000-incident training set, and Table XI corresponds to the results of the 1000-incident training set. The results clearly show that the approach achieves, for all the training sets, an overall high accuracy (total accuracy) that varies from 91% to 99%. Further, the results show that the accuracy achieved by the GP alone (GP accuracy) varies from 83% to 96%. Note that the GP accuracy for all the training sets is similar and comparable to that achieved in Section IX.A (Table V) for the 7000-incident training set. Overall, the results show that the accuracy of the proposed approach is insignificantly affected as the number of training data decreases. This is reasonable and expected, as it is known that GPs constitute an ideal modeling approach when dealing with sparse and/or limited training datasets [23, 24] .
The approximate time required for training the GP classifier and for classifying a single incident is reported in Table XII for all the training data sets examined. The results in Table XII clearly show that both the training and the classification times are significantly reduced with the size of the training set. Specifically, according to the results of the smallest training set (in size), 2 min were required to train the GP classifier and 0.1 s was required to classify a single incident (again utilizing the same MATLAB machine with a CPU at 2.60 GHz and 8 GB RAM).
C. Comparing the Proposed Approach
The proposed fault localization approach is compared to a conventional fault localization method that is merely based on monitoring information. The GBCM heuristic (Algorithm 2) was utilized for comparison purposes. With the GBCM heuristic, we seek to find the number of network nodes that need to be equipped with monitors to achieve the same accuracy as that achieved by the proposed approach.
On this basis, the GBCM was evaluated for different network scenarios. In each network scenario, a different number of monitoring nodes was assumed. Monitoring nodes were added into the network one by one, and the GBCM was evaluated for each monitor addition. Each time, the node with the maximum degree not yet equipped with a monitor was selected. The network simulation parameters (network load, network topology, network bandwidth) were as previously described in Section IX.
For each network scenario, the sets P and P 0 (inputs to the GBCM heuristic) were extracted by injecting 3000 failure incidents into the evolving network. After the execution of the GBCM, the set S fSig n i1 was returned, where n 3000. The GBCM accuracy was evaluated according to Accuracy n 0 ∕n, where n 0 is the number of sets S that include exactly one link (failed link identified). The results are given in Fig. 6 , which illustrates the GBCM accuracy versus the number of monitoring nodes in the network.
Specifically, Fig. 6 shows that for a network load of 7 erlangs, the GBCM heuristic achieves an accuracy nearing that achieved by the proposed approach (93%, as shown in Table V ) when six monitoring nodes are used. Similarly, for the 10 and 20 Erlang load cases, the GBCM heuristic achieves an accuracy nearing that achieved by the proposed approach (96% and 99%, respectively, as shown in Table V) when six monitoring nodes are used. Overall, the results indicate that the proposed approach achieves a significant reduction in the monitoring equipment cost when compared to the conventional method (in this case, the monitoring cost of 60% of the network nodes is eliminated with the utilization of the proposed approach). 
X. CONCLUSIONS
A fault localization scheme is proposed that can be used by service providers to reduce the network cost related to fault localization procedures. In particular, the proposed fault localization scheme consists of two phases. Once a failure is detected, the GBC heuristic is performed to limit the number of suspect failed links. Then, if the GBC heuristic returns more than one suspect link, the failure probability for each suspect link is generated according to the probabilistic link model computed by a state-of-the-art GP classifier.
The proposed scheme achieves a high overall accuracy (reaches 99% for a network load of 20 Erlangs) without utilizing any lightpath probing (extra monitoring equipment). The fault localization accuracy is shown to be insignificantly affected as the number of available past failure incidents decreases. The proposed scheme is also compared to a fault localization approach that is merely based on monitoring equipment (GBCM heuristic), and it is shown that the proposed framework achieves a significant reduction in the monitoring equipment costs. Future work will address scalability issues that may arise for the probabilistic approach as the network grows (i.e., by decomposing the network into domains, and also incorporating into the approach some monitoring information).
